We revisit the problem of differentially private release of classification queries. In this problem, the goal is to design an algorithm that can accurately answer a sequence of classification queries based on a private training set while ensuring differential privacy. We formally study this problem in the agnostic PAC model and derive a new upper bound on the private sample complexity. Our results improve over those obtained in a recent work [BTT18] for the agnostic PAC setting. In particular, we give an improved construction that yields a tighter upper bound on the sample complexity. Moreover, unlike [BTT18], our accuracy guarantee does not involve any blow-up in the approximation error associated with the given hypothesis class.
Introduction
In this paper, we revisit the problem of answering a sequence of classification queries in the agnostic PAC model under the constraint of (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. An algorithm for this problem is given a private training dataset S = {(x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (x n , y n )} of n i.i.d. binary-labeled examples drawn from some unknown distribution D over X × Y, where X denotes an arbitrary data domain (space of feature-vectors) and Y denotes a set of binary labels (e.g., {0, 1}). The algorithm is also given as input some hypothesis class H ⊆ {0, 1}
X of binary functions mapping X to Y. The algorithm accepts a sequence of classification queries given by a sequence of i.i.d. feature-vectors Q = (x 1 ,x 2 , . . .), drawn from the marginal distribution of D over X , denoted as D X . Here, the feature-vectors defining the set of queries Q do not involve any privacy constraint. The queries are also assumed to arrive one at a time, and the algorithm is required to answer the current queryx j by predicting a labelŷ j for it before seeing the next query. The goal is to answer up to a given number m of queries (which is a parameter of the problem) such that, (i) the entire process of answering the m queries is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private, and (ii) the average excess error in the predicted labels does not exceed some desired level α ∈ (0, 1); specifically, i.e., the least possible true (population) error that can be attained by a hypothesis in H (see Section 2 for formal definitions).
One could argue that a more direct approach for differentially private classification would be to design a differentially private learner that, given a private training set as input, outputs a classifier that is safe to publish and then can be used to answer any number of classification queries. However, there are several pessimistic results that either limit or eliminate the possibility of differentially private learning even for elementary problems such as one-dimensional thresholds [BNSV15, ALMM18] . Therefore, it is natural to study the problem of classification-query release under differential privacy as an alternative approach.
A recent formal investigation of this problem was carried out in [BTT18] . This recent work gives an algorithm based on a combination of two useful techniques from the literature on differential privacy, namely, the sub-sample-and-aggregate technique [NRS07, ST13] and the sparse-vector technique [DR14] . The algorithm in [BTT18] , hereafter denoted as A SubSamp , assumes oracle access to a generic, non-private (agnostic) PAC learner B for H. In this work, we give non-trivial improvements over the results of [BTT18] in the agnostic PAC setting. More details on the comparison to [BTT18] are given in the "Related work" section below. Our improvements are in terms of the attainable accuracy guarantees and the associated private sample complexity bounds in the agnostic setting. These improvements are achieved via importing new ideas and techniques from literature (particularly, the elegant agnostic-to-realizable reduction technique of [BNS15] ) to provide an improved construction for the one that appeared in [BTT18] .
Main results
In this work, we formally study algorithms for classification queries release under differential privacy in the agnostic PAC model. We focus on the sample complexity of such algorithms as a function of the privacy and accuracy parameters as well as the number of queries to be answered.
• We give an algorithm for this problem that is well-suited for the agnostic setting. Our algorithm is a two-stage construction that is based on a careful combination of the relabeling technique of [BNS15] and the private classification algorithm A SubSamp of [BTT18] (see "Techniques" section below).
• We show that our construction provides significant improvements over the results of [BTT18] for the agnostic setting:
-The error guarantees in [BTT18] involves a constant blow-up (a multiplicative factor > 2) in the approximation error min h∈H err(h; D) associated with the given hypothesis class H. Using our construction, we give a standard excess error guarantee that does not involve such a blow-up.
-We show that our construction can answer up to m queries with average excess error α using a private sample whose size ≈ VC(H)/α 2 · max 1, √ m α 3/2 (assuming ǫ is a constant, e.g. 0.1), where VC(H) is the VC-dimension of H. Note that this implies that we can answer up to ≈ 1/α 3 queries with private sample size that is essentially the same as the standard non-private sample complexity of agnostic PAC learning. i.e., that many queries can be answered with essentially no additional cost due to privacy.
-Using recent results of [ABM19] on the sample complexity of semi-private learners (introduced in [BNS13] ), we show that our construction immediately leads to an universal private classification algorithm that can answer any number of classification queries using a private sample of size ≈
· max 1, VC(H) α , which is independent of the number of queries. This implies that in the high accuracy regime α < 1/ VC(H), we can privately answer any number of classification queries with private sample size that is essentially the same as the standard non-private sample complexity of agnostic PAC learning.
Techniques: Our algorithm is a two-stage construction. In the first stage, the input training set is pre-processed once and for all via a relabeling procedure due to [BNS15] in which the labels are replaced with the labels generated by an appropriately chosen hypothesis in the given hypothesis class H. This step allows us to reduce the agnostic setting to a realizable one. In the second stage, we first sample a new training set from the empirical distribution of the relabeled set in the first stage, then feed it to A SubSamp of [BTT18] together with other appropriately chosen input parameters.
Related work
Our results are most closely related to [BTT18] . In [BTT18] , Bassily et al. provide formal accuracy guarantees for their algorithm in both the realizable and agnostic settings of the PAC model. However, the accuracy guarantees they provide for the agnostic setting is far from optimal. In particular, their guarantees involves a constant blow-up in the approximation error min h∈H err(h; D), which would limit or eliminate the utility of their construction in scenarios where the approximation error is not negligible. In fact, in most typical scenarios in practice, the approximation error associated with the hypothesis (model) class is a non-negligible constant, (e.g., the test error attained by some stateof-the-art neural networks on benchmark datasets can be as large as 5%, or 10%). Our improved construction avoids this blow-up in the approximation error. The construction in [BTT18] can answer up to m queries with average excess error α + O(γ) (where γ = min h∈H err(h; D) is the approximation error) using a private sample of size ≈
. Given our results discussed in the "Main results" section above, it follows that our sample complexity bound is tighter than that of [BTT18] by roughly a factor of max (1, min ( √ m α, 1/α)). In particular, our bound is tighter by roughly a factor of √ mα for
, and it is tighter by roughly a factor of 1 α for m ≥ 1 α 3 . Equivalently, for the same private sample size, our construction can answer roughly a factor of 1/α 2 more queries than that of [BTT18] .
Bassily et al. [BTT18] also extend their construction to provide a semi-private learner that can finally produce a classifier. This is done by answering a sufficiently large number of queries then applying the knowledge transfer technique using the new training set formed by the set of answered queries. The output classifier can then be used to answer any subsequent queries, and hence, their extended construction provides a universal private classification algorithm. Their private sample complexity bound for this task is ≈ VC(H) 3/2 /α 5/2 (see [BTT18, Theorem 4 .3]). Given our results in the "Main results" section above, our universal private classification algorithm yields a private sample complexity bound that is tighter by roughly a factor of min
Other related works: The problem of differentially private classification has been considered directly or indirectly in several previous works, e.g., [HCB16, PAE + 17, PSM + 18, DF18]. Reference [DF18] considers the problem of differentially private classification in the single-query setting, and gives upper bounds on the private sample complexity for that problem in the PAC model. Our results imply that the bound shown in [DF18] for the agnostic setting is sub-optimal. In the single-query setting (i.e., m = 1), our bound is essentially optimal as it nearly matches the standard non-private sample complexity of the agnostic PAC model.
Preliminaries Notation
For classification tasks we denote the space of feature vectors by X , the set of labels by Y, and the data universe by U = X × Y. A function h : X → Y is called a hypothesis and it labels data points in the feature space X by either 0 or 1 i.e. Y = [0, 1]. A set of hypotheses H ⊆ {0, 1} X is called a hypothesis class. The VC dimension of H is denoted by VC(H). We use D to denote a distribution defined over the space of feature vectors and labels U = X × Y, and D X to denote the marginal distribution over X . A sample dataset of n i.i.d. draws from D is denoted by S = {(x 1 , y 1 ), · · · , (x n , y n )}, where x i ∈ X and y i ∈ Y. 
Empirical error:
The empirical error of a hypothesis h : X → Y with respect to a labeled set S is denoted by err(h; S) Expected disagreement: The expected disagreement between a pair of hypotheses h 1 and h 2 with respect to a distribution D X is defined as dis(
Empirical disagreement: The empirical disagreement between a pair of hypotheses h 1 and h 2 w.r.t.
Realizable setting: In the realizable setting of the PAC model, there exists a h * ∈ H such that err(h * ; D) = 0 i.e., the true labeling function is assumed to be in H. In this setting, the distribution D can be completely described by D X and the hypothesis h * ∈ H. Such a distribution D is called realizable by H. Hence, for realizable distributions, the expected error of a hypothesis h will be denoted as err(h;
Definitions
Next, we define the notion of differential privacy. For any two datasets S, S ′ ∈ U n , we denote the symmetric difference between them by S∆S ′ .
, and every measurable O ⊆ R, we have with probability at least 1 − δ over the coin flips of M , that:
When δ = 0, it is known as pure differential privacy, and parameterized only by ǫ in this case.
We study private classification algorithms that take as input a private labeled dataset S ∼ D n , and a sequence of classification queries Q = (x 1 , . . . ,x m ) ∼ D m X , defined by m unlabeled featurevectors from X , (where m is an input parameter), and output a corresponding sequence of predictions, i.e., labels, (ŷ 1 , . . . ,ŷ m ). Here, we assume that the classification queries come one at a time and the algorithm is required to generate a label for the current query before seeing and responding to the next query. The goal is: i) after answering m queries the algorithm should satisfy (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, and ii) the labels generated should be (α, β)-accurate with respect to a hypothesis class H ⊆ {0, 1}
X : a notion of accuracy which we formally define shortly. We give a generic description of the above classification paradigm in Algorithm 1 below (denoted as A PrivClass ).
n , upper bound on the number of queries: m, sequence of classification queries: Q = (x 1 ,x 2 , . . . ,x m ), hypothesis class: H, privacy parameters ǫ, δ > 0, accuracy: α, and failure probability: β 1: for j = 1, . . . , m do 2:ŷ j ← PrivLabel(S, H,x j ) {Generic procedure that, given S, H and current queryx j , generates a labelŷ j } 3:
Outputŷ j
The algorithm A PrivClass invokes a procedure PrivLabel, which is a generic classification procedure that given the input private training set S and the knowledge of hypothesis class H, it generates a label for an input query (feature-vector)x ∈ X . Definition 2.2 ((ǫ, δ, α, β, n, m)-Private Classification-Query Release Algorithm). Let ǫ, δ, α, β ∈ (0, 1). Let H be a hypothesis class H ⊆ {0, 1} X . A randomized algorithm A (whose generic format is described in Algorithm 1) is said to be an (ǫ, δ, α, β, n, m)-PCQR (private classification-query release) algorithm for H, if the following conditions hold:
For any sequence Q ∈ X
m , A is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private with respect to its input dataset. In the realizable setting, we have an analogous definition where γ = 0. In this case, we say that the algorithm is a PCQR algorithm for H in the realizable setting.
For every distribution
D over X × Y, given a dataset S ∼ D n and a sequence V ((x 1 ,ỹ 1 ), . . . , (x m ,ỹ m )) ∼ D m (wherex i '
Definition 2.3 (α-cover for a hypothesis class). A family of hypotheses H is said to form an alphacover for a hypothesis class H ⊆ {0, 1}
X with respect to distribution D X if for every h ∈ H there
Previous work on private classification-query release [BTT18]
In [BTT18] , they give a construction for a PCQR algorithm (referred to as A SubSamp ), which combines the sub-sample-aggregate framework [NRS07, ST13] with the sparse-vector technique [DR14] . Bassily et al. [BTT18] provide formal privacy and accuracy guarantees with sample complexity bounds for A SubSamp in both the realizable and agnostic settings of the PAC model. Here, we briefly describe the algorithm A SubSamp (Algorithm 2 below), and restate the privacy and accuracy guarantees. The input to A SubSamp is a private labeled dataset S = {(x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (x n , y n )}, a sequence of classification queries Q = (x 1 , . . . ,x m ), and a generic non-private PAC learner B for a hypothesis class H. The algorithm outputs a sequence of private labels (y priv 1 , . . . , y priv m ). The key idea in A SubSamp is as follows: first, it arbitrarily splits S into k equal-sized sub-samples S 1 , . . . , S k for appropriately chosen k. Each of those sub-samples is used to train B. Hence, we obtain an ensemble of k classifiers h S1 , · · · , h S k . Next for each input queryx i ∈ Q, the votes (h S1 (x i ), . . . , h S k (x i )) are computed. It then applies the distance-to-instability test [ST13] on the difference between the largest count of votes and the second largest count. If the majority vote is sufficiently stable, A SubSamp returns the majority vote as the predicted label forx i ; otherwise, it returns a random label. The sparse-vector framework is employed to efficiently manage the privacy budget over the m queries. In particular, by employing the sparse-vector technique, the privacy budget of A SubSamp is only consumed by those queries where the majority vote is not stable. Algorithm A SubSamp takes an input cut-off parameter T , which represents a bound on the total number of "unstable queries" the algorithm can answer before it halts in order to ensure (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
Algorithm 2 A SubSamp [BTT18] : Private Classification via subsample-aggregate and sparse-vector Input: Private dataset: S,upper bound on the number of queries: m, sequence of classification queries: Q = {x 1 , . . . ,x m }, oracle access to non-private learner: B, unstable query cutoff: T , privacy parameters: ǫ, δ > 0, failure probability:
h Sj ← B(S j ) 6: for i ∈ [m] and c ≤ T do 7:
Next, we restate the results of [BTT18] for the realizable and agnostic settings. In the agnostic setting, the accuracy guarantee of [BTT18] is not compatible with Definition 2.2; the accuracy guarantee therein has a sub-optimal dependency on the approximation error, γ (where γ min h∈H err(h; D)). In particular, their result entails a blow-up in γ by a constant factor (≈ 3).
This significantly limit the applicability of this result in scenarios where γ ≫ α. In fact, in practical scenarios, it is typical to have non-negligible approximation error, which is a constant that does not depend on the sample size. For example, a class of neural networks may have γ = 0.1 (i.e., test accuracy cannot exceed 90%) but its excess error can be, say, α = 10 −8 (for a large enough sample). 
Private Release of Classification Queries in the Agnostic PAC Setting
In this section, we give the main results of this paper. We give an improved construction for the private classification-query release algorithm in [BTT18] in the general agnostic setting. Our construction can privately answer up to m queries with excess classification error α, and input sample sizeÕ
, (whereÕ hides log factors of m, 1/α, 1/δ, 1/β). Assuming ǫ = Θ(1), it follows that we can answer up-to ≈ 1/α 3 queries with a private sample whose size is essentially the same as the standard non-private sample complexity of agnostic PAC learning. Comparing to the result of [BTT18] for the agnostic setting, where the private sample size is ≈ 
Overview
Our construction is made up of two phases. The first phase is a pre-processing phase in which the input private sample, S is relabeled using a "good" hypothesisĥ ∈ H. This phase is a reenactment of the elegant technique due to Beimel et al. [BNS15] , which was called LabelBoost Procedure therein. In this phaseĥ can be considered as if it is the true labeling hypothesis and so we can reduce the agnostic setting to the realizable setting. By constructionĥ is chosen such that it is close to the ERM hypothesis h
(where S ′ is a subset of S). As the chosen input sample size is sufficiently large, h ERM S ′ is a good hypothesis, i.e., it attains low excess error. Now as we reduced the problem to the realizable setting, in the next phase we invoke the techniques in [BTT18] . In the second phase, the relabeled training set S ′′ is used to provide input training examples to A SubSamp of [BTT18] (described in Section 2.1). Note that S ′′ is no longer i.i.d., and hence we sample with replacement from S ′′ to form a new dataset. Algorithm A SubSamp then uses this new training set to privately generate labels for a sequence of classification queries. We need to carefully calibrate the privacy parameters of A SubSamp according to the input sample size, the target accuracy guarantee, and also the fact that input to A SubSamp is a re-sampled version of S ′′ and may contain multiple copies of the elements in S ′′ . Note also that the distribution of the input dataset is no longer the true distribution D but the empirical distribution of S ′′ . We give a careful analysis of the overall construction where we show that this re-sampling step does not impact our desired accuracy guarantees.
From the agnostic to the realizable setting: A generic reduction
In this section, we describe the pre-processing step mentioned earlier to reduce the agnostic setting to the realizable setting. This is done via adopting the relabeling technique devised by Beimel et al. in [BNS15] . We denote this procedure here as A Relabel (given by Algorithm 4 below). We briefly describe the algorithm A Relabel below, and state the privacy and accuracy guarantees for it.
Given a private labeled dataset S ∼ D n as input, A Relabel randomly chooses a subset S ′ of S of size n ′ , where n ′ ≈ ǫn. Let S u denote the unlabeled version of S ′ , i.e., S u = {x 1 , . . . , x n ′ }. Given a hypothesis class H with VC(H) = d, A Relabel generates the set of all dichotomies on S u that are realized by H. This is denoted as H (S u ) = {(h(x 1 ), . . . , h(x n ′ )) : h ∈ H}. It then chooses a finite subset H ⊆ H such that each dichotomy in H (S u ) is represented by one of the hypotheses in H. We note that H forms an α-cover for H. Also note that by Sauer's lemma [Sau72] , the size of
Finally, A Relabel chooses a hypothesis h using the exponential mechanism with privacy parameterǫ = 1 and a score function q(S ′ , h) = − err(h; S ′ ). Then, h is used to rebalel S u , and finally output a labeled set S ′′ .
Algorithm 4 A Relabel : Relabel Procedure Input: Training dataset S ∈ (X × Y) n , Hypothesis class H, parameter ǫ ≤ 1.
Sample n ′ random elements without replacement from S and add to S ′ . Let S u = {x 1 , . . . , x n ′ } be the unlabeled version of S ′ .
3: For every (y 1 , . . . , y n ′ ) ∈ H (S u ) = {(h(x 1 ), . . . , h(x n ′ )) : h ∈ H}, add to H any arbitrary hypothesis h ∈ H s.t. h(
4: Use the exponential mechanism with inputs S ′ , H, privacy parameterǫ = 1, and a score function q(S ′ , h) − err(h; S ′ ) to select h from H.
5: Relabel S u using h, and denote this relabeled dataset as S ′′ .
6: Output S ′′ .
Lemma 3.1. The following lemma establishes the accuracy of the hypothesis h selected by the exponential mechanism in Step 4 of A Relabel . In particular, the lemma asserts that the expected error of h is close to that of the ERM hypothesis h . With probability at least 1 − β, hypothesis h (generated in Step 4 of A Relabel ) satisfies the following:
is the ERM hypothesis w.r.t. the sample S ′ generated in Step 2 of A Relabel .
Proof. Note that the score function for the exponential mechanism is − err(h; S ′ ) whose global sensitivity is 1/n ′ . Now, by using the standard accuracy guarantees of exponential mechanism [MT07] (and the fact that its instantiated here with privacy parameter = 1), w.p. ≥ 1 − β/3 we have
Given the value of n in the lemma statement, we have n ′ ≥ 256
. Using this setting of n ′ together with Sauer's Lemma [Sau72] to bound the size ofH, it follows that:
Given the bound on n ′ and the fact that S ′ ∼ D n ′ , by a standard uniform convergence argument from learning theory [SSBD14] , we have the following generalization error bounds. With probability ≥ 1 − 2β/3, we have:
Putting (1)- (3) together, we conclude that w.p. ≥ 1 − β, we have err h; D − err h ERM S ′ ; D ≤ α. This completes the proof.
A Private Classification-Query Release Algorithm
In this section, we describe the overall PCQR algorithm (Algorithm 5 below) that combines the two techniques given by A Relabel , and A SubSamp . As previously, Algorithm 5 (denoted by A AgPrivCl ) takes as input a private dataset S ∼ D n , the total number of queries m, and a sequence of classification queries Q = (x 1 , . . . ,x m ) ∼ D m X . Together with these, A AgPrivCl also has oracle access to a nonprivate PAC learner B PAC for a hypothesis class H (in the realizable setting). Note that, dataset S ′′ (output by A Relabel ) is relabeled using hypothesis h ∈ H. In order to ensure that our input to the next stage is i.i.d., we sample n ′ (size of S ′′ ) points with replacement from the empirical distribution of S ′′ to form a new dataset S. Next, we invoke A SubSamp in the realizable setting with dataset S, m, Q, and B PAC as inputs. We set the cut-off parameter of A SubSamp (the maximum number of allowable "unstable" queries) as T =Õ(mα), where α is the accuracy parameter of B PAC . The privacy parameters to A SubSamp are set to (ǫ,δ), whereǫ,δ will be specified later. This is needed to ensure (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy for the entire construction. Finally we output the sequence of private labels {y n , upper bound on the number of queries: m, sequence of classification queries: Q = (x 1 ,x 2 , . . . ,x m ), a hypothesis class: H, oracle access to nonprivate learner: B PAC for H, privacy parameters ǫ, δ > 0, accuracy parameter α, and failure probability: β 1: T ← max 1,
3: S ← Uniformly sample n ′ points from S ′′ with replacement.
We formally state the main result of this paper in the following theorem. Proof. We will prove the theorem via the following two lemmas that establish the privacy and accuracy guarantees of A AgPrivCl .
Lemma 3.4 (Privacy Guarantee of A AgPrivCl ). A AgPrivCl is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private (with respect to its input dataset).
Proof. Let R(·) denote the uniform sampling procedure in Step 3 in A AgPrivCl ; that is, Step 3 can be written as S ← R(S ′′ ). Note that Steps 3-4 in A AgPrivCl can now be expressed as a composition
In order to prove that A AgPrivCl is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private, it suffices to to show that R • A SubSamp is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private. Note that the input to R • A SubSamp dataset S ′′ , is output by A Relabel . Hence, it follows from Lemma 3.1 that if R • A SubSamp is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private, then A AgPrivCl is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private. Next, we show that R • A SubSamp is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private with respect to S ′′ . Let S In the proof of Lemma 3.5 we will use the following claim. We defer the proof of this claim after the proof of the lemma. . Then, with probability at least 1 − β ′ for any h 1 , h 2 ∈ H, we
and dis(h 1 , h 2 ; S u ) are the expected and empirical disagreement rates, respectively, as defined in Section 2.)
Proof. Consider the description of A Relabel in Algorithm 4. Note that, hypothesis h ∈ H selected in
Step 4 of A Relabel is used to generate labels of S ′′ (output dataset of A Relabel ). Note that the size of S 
and the number of sub-samples k is set in
Step 1 of A SubSamp as follows
Hence, using the setting ofǫ in Step 1 of A AgPrivCl , we have
By standard results in learning theory, it is easy to see that the size of the input sub-sample to . Hence, by Claim 3.6, it follows that w.p.
From the above and the fact that the queries in Q are i.i.d from D X , we invoke the same counting argument in the proof of [BTT18, Theorem 3.2] to show that w.p. ≥ 1 − β 4 , the output labels of A SubSamp satisfy:
denote the ERM hypothesis with respect to the dataset S ′ constructed in Step 2 of A Relabel . Note that Lemma 3.2 implies that w.p.
Since the queries and their true labels ((x 1 ,ỹ 1 ) , . . . , (x m ,ỹ m )) are drawn i.i.d. from D, then by Chernoff's bound and the fact that m ≥ 8 log(1/β) α , we get that w.p. ≥ 1 − β/2 we have
Moreover, from the bound on n ′ and using a basic fact from learning theory, w.p. ≥ 1 − β/8, the ERM hypothesis h 
Now, using (4), (5), and (6) together with a simple application of the triangle inequality and the union bound, we conclude that, w.p. ≥ 1 − β, we have
We now prove Claim 3.6 stated earlier. Note that the proof technique of this claim is similar to that of [ABM19, Lemma 3.3].
Proof of Claim 3.6. For S u ∼ D no X , define the event
We will show that P
By using a standard manipulation, we will show that this is bounded by β ′ when n o is as given in the statement of the claim. Let H ∆ be a hypothesis class defined as H ∆ {h 1 ∆h 2 : h 1 , h 2 ∈ H}. Here the function h 1 ∆h 2 : X → {0, 1} is defined as
Let G H∆ denote the growth function of H ∆ ; i.e. for any number t,
where H∆ (V ) is the set of all dichotomies that can be generated by H ∆ on a set V of size t. Now for any set V of size t, every dichotomy in H∆ (V ) is determined by a pair of dichotomies in H (V ), and thus we get
2d . Let h 0 be the all-zero hypothesis. Note that h 0 ∈ H ∆ . Now, using a standard VC-based uniform convergence argument we have,
Note that the inequality in the third line is non-trivial, and is used unanimously in VC-based uniform convergence bounds (see e.g., [SSBD14] ).
Privately Answering Any Number of Classification Queries
In this section, we describe an universal PCQR algorithm that can answer any number of queries with private sample size that is independent of the number of queries. The main idea is that after answering a number of queries ≈
VC(H)
α , we can use the feature-vectors defining those queries as an auxiliary "public" dataset. Recall that as defined earlier in our problem statement, the set of queries themselves do not entail any privacy constraints. We can then invoke the framework of semi-private learning introduced in [BNS13] , where such auxiliary public dataset can be exploited to finally generate a classifier that is safe to publish. In particular, a semi-private learner takes as input two types of datasets: a private labeled dataset, and another auxiliary public dataset. The algorithm needs to satisfy differential privacy only with respect to the private dataset.
A recent construction of a semi-private learner is given in [ABM19, Algorithm 1] (referred to as A SSPP ), where it is shown that it suffices to have a public unlabeled dataset of size ≈ [ABM19] is that the public unlabeled dataset can be used to create a finite α-cover for H, and hence, reducing the task of privately learning H to the task of learning a finite sub-class of H (the α-cover).
Using this result, we can extend our construction in Section 3.2 to allow for privately answering any number of classification queries using a private training set whose size is independent of the number of queries. In Algorithm 6 below (denoted as A UnvPrivCl ), we describe our universal PCQR algorithm.
Algorithm 6 A UnvPrivCl : Universal Private Classification-Query Release Algorithm Input: Private dataset: S ∈ U n , number of queries: m, sequence of classification queries: Q = (x 1 , . . . ,x m ), hypothesis class: H, oracle access to a non-private PAC learner for H: B PAC , privacy parameters ǫ, δ > 0, accuracy parameter α, and failure probability β. We finally formalize this observation in the following theorem. 
